Abstract
Kant’s views of the “rational psychology”, which are especially presented in the section of Critique of Pure Reason entitled "Paralogisms of Pure Reason", are one of the very important but relatively neglected topics in his thought. The book "Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy" is the first book in Persian that has placed this topic in the focus of its attention and discussion. The following article has attempted to provide a detailed description of the characteristics and content of this work, as well as to evaluate it with an analytical-critical approach. After introducing the Book, the article reviews and evaluates it in three areas: 1)formal dimensions and aspects, 2)structural and methodological dimensions, and 3)philosophical content. The result of this evaluation is that this work, along with some of its formal or content strengths, has some serious and fundamental flaws that overshadow its strengths: 1)More than half of the book is devoted to introductory and marginal discussions; 2)A large part of the book's main discussions are the result of translating and compiling materials from some important English works on this subject, which, due to the lack of clear and direct references to them and the author's interferences in the arrangement and composition of their phrases, the logical coherence of these discussions have been reduced; 3)The logical coherence and interconnection between the book's components is weak; 4)Most of the criticisms made in it on Kant's views are superficial and shallow, and without a coherent rational and logical method and approach.

Introduction
Immanuel Kant's philosophical thought stands among the most influential intellectual achievements in the history of Western philosophy. It is virtually impossible to identify a significant Western thinker after Kant who has not been influenced, whether positively or negatively, by his ideas. Scholars and researchers have traditionally devoted their attention to three main divisions of Kant's theoretical philosophy—transcendental aesthetics, transcendental analytic, and transcendental dialectic—with the first two, and particularly the transcendental analytic, receiving the lion's share of scholarly attention. The topics and discussions presented in the transcendental dialectic, by contrast, have generally been treated as secondary and marginal concerns within Kant scholarship.
In the contemporary West, however, particularly since the second half of the twentieth century, interest in the "paralogisms of pure reason" and Kant's psychological views has increased substantially. A considerable number of significant books and articles have been published on this subject, including Jonathan Bennett's Kant's Dialectic, Karl Ameriks's Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Andrew Brook's Kant and the Mind, Patricia Kitcher's Kant's Transcendental Psychology, Kant's Thinker, and Kant's Paralogisms, Susan Mendus's Kant's Doctrine of Self, and numerous others. These works reflect a growing appreciation among scholars of the particular importance and status of the "paralogisms of pure reason" and their role and influence within the broader edifice of Kant's philosophy.
The "paralogisms of pure reason" constitutes a section of the transcendental dialectic concerned with arguments and discussions about the soul. In this section, Kant seeks to demonstrate that philosophical (metaphysical) arguments concerning the existence of the soul and its attributes and characteristics are, in reality, paralogisms—fallacious inferences—and do not provide genuine knowledge of these matters. However, the positions and views Kant presents in this section stand in tension with certain fundamental principles of his philosophy concerning the transcendental "I" and the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. This tension is precisely what lends this discussion its particular significance. The fact that the section on the paralogisms of pure reason is the only portion of the transcendental dialectic to undergo complete revision and rewriting in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason provides yet another indication of its importance.
Attention to Kant's philosophy in Iran has increased significantly, especially in recent decades. Iranian thinkers and scholars have tended to focus on the foundational portions of Kant's philosophy—transcendental aesthetics and especially the transcendental analytic—or on the general outlines of his thought. In recent years, however, attention to more specialized topics within Kant's theoretical philosophy, including the "paralogisms of pure reason" and issues related to psychology in Kant's thought, has become visible. One of the earliest works in this area is The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy (Mughālaṭāt-i 'Aql-i Maḥḍ dar Falsafeh-ye Kant), the first book in Persian to address specifically the psychological issues in Kant's thought and the topic of the paralogisms of pure reason. The importance of this book lies in its having drawn attention to this significant subject and opened a path for reflection and deliberation on this topic in contemporary Iran. It is clear that, in order to continue this path, such works and efforts must first be introduced to the scholarly community and second be critiqued and evaluated according to scientific standards and criteria. Accordingly, the present article introduces and critiques this book, with the hope that this introduction and critical examination will contribute to the growth and flourishing of thought and criticism concerning Kant's psychological views.

Research Methodology
The present study employs an analytical-critical approach to provide a precise descriptive account of the characteristics and content of the book The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy. The research proceeds through several stages. First, a brief general introduction to the book is provided, including its publication history, structure, and chapter organization. Second, the work is subjected to critical evaluation along three principal axes: (1) formal and typographical aspects, including the book's physical appearance, spelling, grammatical and editorial matters, citations, and quotations; (2) structural and methodological dimensions, including the organization of material, the relationship among chapters, the coherence and logical continuity of the text, and the extent of the author's original contribution; and (3) philosophical content and substance, including the accuracy and completeness of the book's presentation of Kant's views and the quality and depth of its critique of Kant's positions.
The analysis draws upon the text of the book itself, comparing its content with the primary sources from which it draws—most notably Henry Allison's Kant's Transcendental Idealism and Jonathan Bennett's Kant's Dialectic—as well as with the broader scholarly literature on Kant's paralogisms. The research also engages with relevant Persian-language scholarship on Kant's theoretical philosophy, including the author's own previous work on Kant's argument for the impossibility of theoretical knowledge of the soul. Throughout the analysis, attention is paid to both the strengths and weaknesses of the book, with the aim of providing a balanced and constructive assessment that can contribute to the improvement of future scholarship in this field.

Discussion
Formal and Typographical Evaluation
The book's physical appearance, printing, and binding are generally good and acceptable. The font and type size used in the text, as well as the line spacing, margins, and spacing between text and page edges, are appropriate and do not confuse the reader. The cover design and colors are attractive and suitable. The abstract printed on the back cover, notwithstanding some minor issues, provides a good brief introduction to the book's content.
In the main text, typographical and orthographic errors are relatively few. However, certain errors appear, including the use of "māddeh-ye ma'rifat" instead of "māddeh-ye ma'rifat" on page 56; "va pīshīnī" instead of "va pīshīn" on page 62; "'ulūm-i ḥuṣūlī-i yaqīnī" instead of "'ulūm-i ḥuṣūlī-i yaqīn" in the second paragraph of page 70; and "quvveh-ye ḥukm kardan bā vāsiṭeh" instead of "quvveh-ye ḥukm kardan bā vāsiṭ" in the second paragraph of page 96. On page 144, the word "shak" (doubt) is superfluous and has mistakenly been inserted between "yik" and "shuhūd," producing "yik shak shuhūd" instead of "yik shuhūd." On page 140, the inference symbol (→) is missing between the two symbols Q and -Q. At the end of page 160, the phrase "va īn uṣūl bar ṭabī'at iṭlāq and" has been omitted. In footnote 179, "si īdeh-ye 'aqlī" has been mistakenly written as "si īdeh-ye 'aqlī." On page 184, at the end of the first paragraph, the verb "kunīm," which ends the sentence, is repeated. On page 200, the verb "kunīm" is again repeated at the end of the first paragraph.
Typographical errors in the footnotes and endnotes are mostly related to English citations. The pages in question include 18, 28, 37, 52, 79, 89, 94, 102, 104, 111, 115, 119, 126, 142, 167, 172, 184, 216, and 227. In some places, errors have been repeated across multiple pages. In the "Proper Names" index at the end of the book, there are also instances of typographical errors in the footnotes. For example, "Andronicus of Rhodes" has been mistakenly written as "Andronicus Rūsī," and "Jonathan Bennett" has been written as "B[ennett], Jonathan" and "Z[?], Jonathan."
Regarding grammar and editing, several issues merit attention. In the second paragraph of page 19 (the book's introduction), the phrase "chunān keh khwāhīm guft" appears between the two phrases "hamīn iqtiḍā-ye 'aql barā-ye farātar raftan az qalamraw-i tajriba" and "keh Kant az ān beh muṭlaq-girā'ī va nā-mashrūṭ-khwāhī-ye 'aql-i naẓarī ta'bīr mī-kunad," whereas it should be placed after the second phrase. On page 23 (the end of the introduction), in a footnote, the phrase "dar vajh-i tasmiyeh Shīdān Shīd beh janāb-i duktur..." appears; it should read "dar vajh-i tasmiyeh-i janāb-i duktur beh Shīdān Shīd...." It should also be noted that the author's statement at the end of this footnote—"In reality, he (Dr. Ḥusayn-'Alī Shīdān Shīd) is, from the perspective of perfection, pure light"—is, notwithstanding respect and reverence for all scholars, an exaggeration, and the use of such expressions does not seem appropriate.
It would have been better to use combinations such as "Muslim philosophers" (falāsifeh-ye musalmān) instead of "Islamic philosophers" (falāsifeh-ye islāmī) and "Muslim sages" (ḥukamā-ye musalmān) instead of "Islamic sages" (ḥukamā-ye islāmī). On page 172, the phrase "naqd-i duvvum-i Kant keh dar mawrid-i ṭarḥ-i Dikārtī darbāreh-ye shakākiyyat-i ifrāṭī ast, bar asās-i tab'yīn-i Kant az idrāk-i nafsānī mubtanī ast" contains redundancy, since the meaning of "asās" is already present in "mubtanī ast." The final portion of this phrase should be corrected to "bar tab'yīn-i Kant az idrāk-i nafsānī mubtanī ast" or "bar asās-i tab'yīn-i Kant az idrāk-i nafsānī ast." In some cases, the conjunction "keh" appears before the quotation and after the verb "mī-gūyad," followed by a colon; in these instances, the "keh" is superfluous (see, for example, pages 257 and 264).
Citations and Quotations
Several deficiencies are evident in the book's citations and quotations. First, some sentences are presented as quotations, but their sources are not specified. For example, the sentence "Allison mī-gūyad:..." appears on pages 170–171 without citation of the source. Second, in numerous instances, quotations from the original text are not distinguished from the author's own text—that is, the quotation is neither placed within quotation marks nor separated from the main text by smaller font size or indentation; rather, the author has simply placed a colon before the quotation (pages 175, 200, 203, 206, and 217). There are also cases in which the author's own text appears within the quotation (pages 189, 197, 217, and 243). In general, there is no uniform procedure in the book for distinguishing quotations from the main text.
Third, in citations of English sources, there are instances in which the citation is given in Persian language and script (see, for example, page 186, footnote 2; page 199, footnote 3; page 227, footnote 3), whereas in most cases, citations are given in the original English language and script. Apart from the principle that citations should be given in the language of the source, there is no uniformity of procedure in citation practice. Moreover, there are cases in which part of a reference is given in Persian and another part in English (page 217, footnote 4; page 226, footnote 2). Fourth, the citation style in most cases follows the format of author's name, book title, and page number, but in a few instances this style is not observed, and citation follows the format of author's name, year of publication, and page number (page 199, footnotes 3 and 4). Citation style should be uniform throughout the text.
Fifth, in various parts of the book, reference is made to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; in most cases, the citation follows the standard format, but in some instances the page number of an English translation is given instead (pages 80 and 81, footnotes 2). It is therefore unclear which of the two English translations listed in the bibliography is being referenced. Sixth, the book's title uses the expression "paralogisms of pure reason," but in the text, the term "paralogism" is used instead. The reason for this inconsistency is not clear, and it would be expected that, if the author has a preferred reason for using "paralogism" rather than "fallacy" or vice versa, this should be stated.
Seventh, in the table of contents (apart from chapter titles) and consequently in the main and subsidiary headings of the text, no numbering is used; the headings and their order (main versus subsidiary) in the table of contents are apparently distinguished by the degree of indentation. In scholarly works, this practice is not appropriate; rather, the order of material should be specified by numbering the main and subsidiary headings, thereby facilitating the reader's task. Eighth, the book lacks a "conclusion" section, whereas such a section is, if not necessary and indispensable, at least desirable and expected.
Structural and Methodological Evaluation
While the formal aspects of a scholarly work are important, it is evident that the principal value and significance of a work relate to the structure and organization of its material, the methodology governing its text, and the strength or weakness of its scholarly content. In evaluating the success and scholarly value of a work, these matters should be given primary attention.
Regarding the topic and general content of the book, one of the criteria for evaluating the strength or weakness of a scholarly work is the importance and originality of its subject. By this criterion, the book is a valuable and noteworthy work, because it is devoted to a topic and discussion within Kant's thought and philosophy that, despite its particular importance and value, has received comparatively little attention. As mentioned in the introduction, dedicated and focused discussion of the "paralogisms of pure reason" and, more generally, of psychological issues in Kant's thought has been relatively neglected not only in Iran but also in the West until recent decades. Kant scholarship in Iran, prior to the publication of this book, had produced only one scholarly work of note on this subject: an article entitled "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason from Kant's Perspective" by Muḥammad Ḥakkāk, published in 1999 in the journal Falsafeh-ye Dīn. In the present author's view, highlighting the topic of psychology in Kant's thought is one of the principal strengths of this book. The extent of the author's success in providing a precise and profound analysis of this topic and in offering scholarly critique of Kant's views is, however, a separate matter to which we now turn.
Regarding the book's introduction, it is one of the most important sections of a book or research work, playing a significant role in acquainting the reader with the subject and discussions of the work. The introduction written for this book does not appear to be an appropriate and acceptable introduction to the subject and discussions presented in the book. The content of the introduction comprises three general headings: the importance of the problem, the status of psychology, and the organization of the research. Most of the material in the section on "the importance of the problem" concerns the value and status of knowledge of the soul, written with reference to religious texts and sources from Islamic philosophy. On the basis of this material, it is stated at the end of the introduction: "In any case, discussions related to the soul are among the principal and noble discussions of philosophy, and the importance of addressing this topic, especially from the perspective of an influential philosopher such as Kant, is not hidden" (Ma'sūm, 1390/2011, pp. 17–18). While the points and material in this section are important and valuable in their own right, they do not represent the book's discussion or the reason for and extent of its importance. The book's main discussion is the "paralogisms of pure reason" in Kant's philosophy, yet in the section on "the importance of the problem," no reference is made to the paralogisms of pure reason. The material in this section and the conclusion drawn from it are such that, if someone were unfamiliar with Kant's thought and philosophy, they might imagine that Kant has valuable and precious material concerning knowledge of the soul, in the direction of consolidating and strengthening it, which is to be addressed in this book—whereas both the author and the informed reader know clearly, and indeed the author himself has indicated in the same introduction, that Kant's claim concerns the impossibility of knowledge of the soul.
The second heading in the introduction is "the status of psychology." This section begins as follows: "In what the Islamic sages have presented in the discussion of the soul and what Kant has said in this regard, there are matters for comparison; among them, perhaps the examination of the status of psychology among philosophical discussions and the question of which method should be used to resolve these discussions are among the most important of these matters" (ibid., p. 18). After a reference to the views of philosophers before Mullā Ṣadrā and Mullā Ṣadrā himself concerning the status of psychological discussions among the various branches of philosophy, Kant's view concerning the impossibility of knowledge of the soul is stated for the first time in the book's introduction. Thereafter, the author attempts to find a kind of similarity between Kant's view concerning "the absolutism and unconditioned-seeking of reason" and the views of Islamic sages and mystics concerning "the insatiability and absolutism-seeking of the human being," accompanied by quotations from Muslim mystics and sages and references to noble Qur'anic verses. The introduction of this heading and the material beneath it in the introduction of a book that, according to its author, seeks to analyze and examine Kant's views on the "paralogisms of pure reason" does not seem appropriate.
Regarding the correspondence between the book's content and its title and purpose, the book's title is "The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy." Given this title, one expects the book to present discussions concerning the analysis and examination of the "paralogisms of pure reason" and their status in Kant's philosophy. Moreover, although this is not apparent from the title alone, the author has stated in the book's abstract and introduction that, in addition to presenting, explaining, and elucidating Kant's views on these so-called "paralogisms," the book also critiques Kant's statements and claims concerning them (ibid., pp. 14 and 22). It must therefore be seen to what extent what appears in the text of the book corresponds to this title and purpose.
A cursory glance at the text of the book and its various chapters shows that more than half of the book's main body (chapters one through five) is devoted to discussions that have no direct connection to the book's main subject and purpose, and this is one of the book's principal weaknesses. The book's main discussion appears in chapters six through nine, but "before entering this main discussion, certain more general discussions of Kant's philosophy, which are necessary for understanding his discussions of the soul and influential in those discussions," are presented (ibid., p. 22). If we take the author at his word, the reason for including those preliminary discussions (chapters one through five) is that they are necessary for understanding Kant's discussions of the soul and influential in those discussions. The question that arises, however, is whether this volume of material and discussions presented as preliminary discussions in chapters one through five is in fact necessary and influential for understanding the main discussions. It appears that much of this material constitutes marginal discussion and is not particularly necessary or influential for understanding the book's main discussions. Examples include "the relationship between science and philosophy" in chapter five, "how mathematics and physics are possible from Kant's perspective" in chapter one, the historical background of terms such as "dialectic" and "idea" in chapters two and four, and discussions such as "the analytic (regressive) and synthetic (progressive) method from Kant's perspective," which the author treats at length.
Some of the material presented in the first five chapters has no direct connection to the book's main subject and discussion, and even that portion of the material that is in some way related to the main subject and discussion, and that serves as an introduction, suffers from excessive prolixity due to its volume and is elaborated far beyond what is necessary—such that the volume of the preliminaries exceeds that of the main discussions. It appears that the amount of preliminary discussion necessary for understanding and analyzing Kant's view on the paralogisms of pure reason could have been summarized and presented in a single chapter. The discussions in chapters six through nine relate to the book's main subject. It is worth noting that, although the author attempts in these four chapters to address the most important issues and discussions related to the book's main subject and purposes, given the small volume of these discussions (approximately forty percent of the book), this does not appear reasonable or appropriate.
Some of the book's main discussions are presented very briefly and superficially. This is particularly evident in the discussion concerning the critique of Kant's views and positions on the paralogisms of pure reason. As noted, the author identifies as one of the book's purposes and themes the critique of Kant's statements and the exposure of his lapses. But reference to the text of the book shows that this purpose has been realized, at best, superficially and in passing. The only portion of the book specifically devoted to critiquing Kant's statements and views on the paralogisms of pure reason is the final chapter. This chapter comprises three main headings.
The first heading is "critique of Kant's foundations in the paralogisms." In this section, which is less than a single full page, only a reference to certain of Kant's foundations (not all of them, nor even most of them) is made, and in practice no critical discussion or analysis of these foundations is undertaken. It is entirely clear that devoting less than one page to critiquing Kant's "foundations" in the paralogisms—foundations that are the basis of all his other discussions on this subject—is in no way sufficient.
The second heading is "scattered critiques." In this section, points and material (thirteen items), most of which are in the form of selected aphorisms, are first presented concerning the "first paralogism" (ibid., pp. 250–256). Then a very brief discussion (about one page) concerning the "second and third paralogisms and the simplicity and unity of the soul" is presented, the content of which consists of brief and scattered quotations from Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā. Thereafter, "the difference between intuitive knowledge and conceptual knowledge" (in twelve brief paragraphs) and "rational proofs of the immateriality of the soul" are presented.
Apart from the title of this section ("scattered critiques"), which does not seem particularly appropriate and may suggest a kind of haste and lack of coherence in the author's discussions, the method of presenting material is also weak. The author's "method" in critiquing Kant's views and positions is not a coherent analytical-logical method but rather a superficial and surface-level method. That is, instead of identifying and analyzing the principal foundations and premises of Kant's statements and claims and evaluating these premises and the conclusions derived from them according to logical principles and criteria, the author primarily engages in quoting certain material and views from Islamic philosophy and in a kind of scattered discourse, without clearly specifying the connection of this material to Kant's view.
For example, brief and scattered quotations from Aristotle and Ibn Sīnā concerning the unity and simplicity of the soul are presented, the connection of which to the second and third paralogisms is unclear. Similarly, the relationship of the material presented under the heading "the difference between intuitive knowledge and conceptual knowledge" to the second and third paralogisms is unclear, and it is not evident what critique of Kant's view concerning these two paralogisms emerges from this material. Or again, the material presented under the heading "rational proofs of the immateriality of the human soul," although related to the two topics of the second and third paralogisms, is not in itself a critique of Kant's view. If we have two different or contradictory views on a subject, can the falsity of the opposing view and the arguments advanced for it be concluded merely from quoting one view and stating its arguments? If this were the case, then from quoting Kant's view and stating his argument concerning, for example, the simplicity of the soul or the identity of the soul, we would have to conclude that the view of, for example, 'Allāmeh Ṭabāṭabā'ī or Shahīd Muṭahharī concerning the simplicity and identity of the soul is incorrect. But it is clear that this conclusion is incorrect. As noted, the correct method in critiquing and examining a view is the analytical-logical method, and this is precisely what appears to be absent from the author's discussions, at least in this section.
Moreover, for some of the material presented in paragraphs 2, 5, 9, and 13, no explanation or argument is provided. Of course, among the material in this section, there are also correct and noteworthy points and critiques (paragraphs 1, 6, 7, and 11), but sufficient discussion and analysis of them has not been undertaken.
The third heading, in the final part of chapter nine, presents various and scattered points and material in fourteen paragraphs. Many of the observations made concerning the previous section apply here as well. The statement of certain claims without any specific argument being advanced for them, or without sufficient discussion, is among the most important of these issues. But apart from chapter nine, in which most of the author's critical material concerning Kant's views is presented, there is also a specific portion of the book in which we encounter a critical perspective on Kant's positions.
At the end of chapter one, in a discussion entitled "the proof of metaphysics from the perspective of Islamic sages," the author attempts to advance a critical perspective on Kant's view concerning the impossibility of metaphysics as a science. But the introduction of this discussion in the first chapter of the book, which is concerned with presenting Kant's views, is not only unnecessary but also methodologically incorrect and inappropriate. It would have been better for the author to present this discussion in chapter nine, in the section concerned with critiquing Kant's foundations. It also appears that the discussion advanced for the proof of metaphysics is incomplete and superficial. The negative consequences and implications of such superficial treatments of important and fundamental topics and discussions are greater than the positive consequences and implications that exist in the minds of those individuals as motivation for addressing these discussions.
Chapter Organization and Logical Coherence
The manner of the book's chapter organization and the relationship among its various chapters—which in reality indicates the degree of coherence and logical interconnection of the book's material—is addressed in this section. The first critique that applies to the book's chapter organization is that it lacks a plan, model, or logical order and arrangement, or such order is weak. For example, the second chapter of the book is devoted to the semantics of the term "transcendental dialectic," whereas the semantics of "paralogism" (fallacy) and its types from Kant's perspective has not been accorded even a single independent paragraph, let alone a chapter. This is despite the fact that the concept of "paralogism" and its semantics in Kant's work is more closely and directly related to the book's main discussion than the concept of "transcendental dialectic." Another example is the discussion concerning "the relationship between science and philosophy": apart from the question of how fundamentally this discussion relates to the book's main subject, why does it appear in the fifth chapter and not, for example, in the second or third chapter? Or why does it appear as a separate chapter when it could have been included as part of the first chapter? These and similar cases show that there is no model or logical basis in the book's chapter organization.
A second critique that applies to the book's chapter organization is that the chapters are disconnected and separate from one another, with no connecting link or thread among them. One chapter ends and the next begins without any logical connection between the final paragraph and expressions of the previous chapter and the first paragraph and expressions of the next chapter. In other words, the book's chapters are like independent islands. For example, the fourth chapter, entitled "the ideas of pure (transcendental) reason," ends with the following statement: "Every limited being, by reason of its limitation, possesses certain negative predicates, and since negative predicates can be known only through their corresponding positive predicates, there must exist an idea containing all possible positive predicates, and that is the ideal of pure reason or the idea of God" (ibid., p. 152). And immediately thereafter, the fifth chapter, entitled "the relationship between science and philosophy," begins with the following statement: "By 'science' here is meant empirical science, which consists of the collection of empirical propositions devoted to the discussion of a particular subject and expressing the states and characteristics of a particular portion of the world; such as physics, chemistry, geology, biology, astronomy, and the like" (ibid., p. 153). As can be seen, there is no connection or continuity between the content of these two chapters. Careful study of the book shows that in none of the book's chapters is there any preparation or paving of the ground for the discussion of the next chapter (at least explicitly and in the author's expressions) or any reference to points and material from previous chapters. This point in reality indicates the weakness of the connection and logical coherence and continuity of the book's discussions.
A third point that appears relevant in this connection is that at the beginning of each chapter, there is usually no appropriate introduction and preparation for the topic or discussion presented in that chapter. That is, not only is the discussion of one chapter largely disconnected from the discussion of the previous chapter, but at the beginning of the chapter itself there is no appropriate preparation for entering into the discussion of that chapter. For example, in the sixth chapter, whose title is "the soul and psychological perception from Kant's perspective," without an introduction explaining, for example, what "psychological perception" means (in this discussion, even the English equivalent of this term is not mentioned) and what relationship this topic has to Kant's discussion of the paralogisms of pure reason, we immediately encounter the subheading "the relationship of psychological perception to the existence of the soul," which begins with these words: "For the discussion, from Kant's perspective, of the relationship of psychological perception to the existence of the soul, three interrelated aspects must be distinguished in this discussion, and something must be said about each" (ibid., p. 167).
The introduction of certain concepts and topics without introduction, and in a so-called sudden manner, and discussion of them is a point that is also observed in some of the material within the chapters. For example, in a passage from the sixth chapter (ibid., final paragraph of p. 171), we encounter the expression "his (Kant's) general discussion of the paralogisms," whereas before this expression and after it, nothing has been said about this term and what is meant by it, and it is not clear what "Kant's general discussion of the paralogisms" refers to and where it is presented. Or in another expression from the same chapter (ibid., p. 173), "Kant's official view" is mentioned, without any explanation of the basis or foundation of its being "official." Of course, all these points and objections have their root in another matter to which we now turn.
The Extent of the Author's Presence (Scholarly Originality)
One of the important and principal criteria in examining a scholarly work is the extent of the author's presence and influence on the book's content and substance—that is, to what extent the work is the product of the author's own thought, reflection, and analysis, or the product of transmitting and reporting the scholarly and intellectual efforts of others. It appears that the material under discussion has drawn upon a spectrum of scholarly and intellectual works: works that contain a new view or theory and in which a major portion of the work is devoted to presenting and explaining this new and original view or theory, and works that have collected and reported the views and positions of others. It is evident that each category of these works, provided that the scholarly and technical principles and standards relevant to each are observed, has its own particular importance. But in each category of these works, the author's presence and the reader's perception of that presence are necessary and required in accordance with the nature of that work. If a work that is a report of the intellectual achievements of others is the product of an author, the author can demonstrate his presence through the correct, coherent, logical, and faithful understanding and presentation of those intellectual achievements.
Careful reading and examination of the book The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy shows that major and important portions of it (chapters six, seven, and eight), in which the book's main discussions appear, are taken (translated and arranged) from several English books or articles to which the author, without precise citation, has made extensive modifications, selected different phrases and paragraphs, translated them, and placed them alongside one another, rewriting the material. This approach has given rise to dispersion, heterogeneity, and lack of coherence in the book's material and expressions.
The entire sixth chapter, entitled "the soul and psychological perception from Kant's perspective," is a selective translation with minor modifications of portions of two books: Kant's Transcendental Idealism by Henry Allison and Kant's Dialectic by Jonathan Bennett. The major portion of this chapter (the entire chapter, with the exception of the final heading of the chapter, pp. 167–179) is a translation of pages 279–293 of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, although portions of it have been alternately omitted or transposed at the author's discretion, with modifications. (See Kant's Transcendental Idealism, pp. 279–293.) The material under the final heading of the sixth chapter, "Kant's view concerning reality," however, is taken from Kant's Dialectic, pages 49–50, and is a translation with minor modifications of those pages. (See Kant's Dialectic, pp. 49–50.)
The first part of the seventh chapter, entitled "the critique of rational psychology and the paralogisms" (pp. 183–187), is a translation of another portion of Kant's Transcendental Idealism (pp. 283–286), encompassing the beginning of the chapter up to the beginning of the heading "the possibility of inner experience and the error of rational psychology." The title of the seventh chapter is also the title of section III of Allison's book, which has here been brought with modifications in the sixth chapter. If the order and continuity of Allison's material had been preserved, this material should have appeared in the sixth chapter, but at the author's discretion and choice, it has been separated from there and brought at the beginning of the seventh chapter.
The continuation of the seventh chapter, from the heading "the possibility of inner experience and the error of rational psychology" to the end of the chapter, with the exception of the final paragraph of the chapter (pp. 180–187), is taken from Kant's Dialectic (pp. 68–98), although extensive modifications have been made in it. (See Kant's Dialectic, pp. 68–98.) The final paragraph of this chapter is also taken from the article "Kant's Paralogisms" (Chadwick and Cazeaux, 1992, pp. 105 and 127). The seventh chapter, with the title "an analytical look at the paralogisms," is also like the two previous chapters of the book. The entire chapter, with the exception of its final heading (pp. 211–244), is a translation of the article "Kant's Paralogisms," with the author making minor modifications in the original article. (See Chadwick and Cazeaux, 1992, pp. 105–125.)
It can therefore be said that a large portion of the author's discussions in the important and principal chapters of the book is an analysis of Kant's views and positions concerning the paralogisms of pure reason; it consists of selections from several important works on this subject in English that the author, on the basis of his own view, has selected, translated, and organized in three chapters. This has diminished the logical coherence of the book's main discussions.
Philosophical Content and Substance
The philosophical discussions presented in the book include (1) the report of Kant's views and positions concerning the paralogisms of pure reason and (2) the critique and examination of Kant's views in this regard. General observations in these two areas follow.
Regarding the book's report of Kant's views and positions, the direct use of English sources in the text of the book has, to some extent, contributed to the author's success in presenting Kant's views concerning the "paralogisms of pure reason"; useful points and material for understanding and analyzing Kant's positions on this subject have been provided to the reader. The author could, however, also have made use of the works of Kant's prominent and first-rank commentators, such as Kemp Smith or Paton. But the derivative and synthetic character of the report presented of Kant's views has caused this report to lack sufficient logical coherence and clarity, with the result that the reader does not gain a proper understanding of Kant's views. This situation can be observed in the seventh and eighth chapters of the book. The author presents and analyzes Kant's views concerning the paralogisms of pure reason (the first through third paralogisms) once in the seventh chapter, entitled "the critique of rational psychology and the paralogisms," and again in the eighth chapter, entitled "an analytical look at the paralogisms," repeating these concepts. It is evident that each of these commentators or expositors (for example, Bennett or Kitcher) has approached the report and analysis of Kant's views from a particular standpoint, and of course, important and noteworthy points are also mentioned. But the problem is that, by presenting each of these reports and analyses separately and in scattered fashion in two separate chapters and by failing to provide a clear and specific summary of Kant's position and view concerning each of the paralogisms of pure reason, a coherent and strong analysis of Kant's views and claims concerning the paralogisms of pure reason is ultimately not provided. In other words, the weakness of the report presented of Kant's views and positions concerning the paralogisms of pure reason in this book is that, first, only certain commentators on Kant have been consulted, and their statements in explanation of the paralogisms have merely been recounted—whereas the author could have made good use of the statements and explanations of certain other first-rank commentators on Kant, such as Kemp Smith or Paton, or could have added analyses or points of his own. Second, the statements and explanations relating to certain commentators on Kant are presented separately and in scattered fashion in two different chapters, and for this reason, a clear and specific summary of the paralogisms of pure reason in Kant's thought is ultimately not provided.
Regarding the author's critiques of Kant's views and positions, the second task the author has set for himself in this book (see Ma'sūm, 1390/2011, pp. 14 and 22) is the critique and examination of Kant's views. In the ninth chapter, the author presents critical points concerning Kant's positions and views on the paralogisms of pure reason. This chapter and the author's critiques are, in certain respects, the most important and principal portion of the book and therefore require more careful reflection and examination.
The author begins this chapter with a precise heading—"critique of Kant's foundations in the paralogisms"—and writes: "The views Kant has adopted concerning the soul rest on more fundamental positions, such that if those positions are flawed, his statements concerning the soul are also undermined from a logical point of view" (ibid., p. 249). This approach is entirely correct: in order to critique and examine a view, one should go to the foundations and principles on which that view rests. It is expected that, having begun with this statement, the author would proceed to critique and examine the principal foundations and principles of Kant's views concerning the paralogisms of pure reason. But in the continuation, only two of Kant's views (the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions and the progression of sense-understanding-reason in the process of knowledge) are mentioned as the principal foundations of his views in the paralogisms of pure reason, and the discussion of them is completed in the same single page. Thereafter, the material continues with "scattered critiques" (see ibid., pp. 250–256). In the section on "scattered critiques," although good critical points concerning the first three paralogisms are advanced, these critiques are particular, scattered, and brief, and sufficient discussion and elaboration of them has not been undertaken. Moreover, these critiques do not concern Kant's principal foundations.
The author should, in this section, have addressed the principal foundations of Kant's views concerning the paralogisms of pure reason and then discussed and critiqued them in detail. As noted in certain related studies (see Ḥamdullāhī and Umīd, 1397/2018), the principal and foundational bases of Kant's claims concerning "the impossibility of knowledge of the soul" and the impossibility of rational and theoretical knowledge of the soul are, first, his definition and conception of "knowledge" and the branches and consequences arising from it, and second, his definition and description of "the soul." But in the author's material in the chapter concerned with "the critique of Kant's statements concerning the paralogisms," these principal and foundational matters have not been addressed.
According to Kant's definition and understanding, "knowledge" is something that arises from the cooperation of two faculties: intuition and understanding (Kant, 1929: B74). The cooperation of these two faculties means, simply, that what is obtained through intuition (the manifold of sensory intuition) is brought under the pure concepts of the understanding. In other words, the pure concepts of the understanding are applied to the manifold of sensory intuition. Of these two correct formulations, Kant's prevalent and standard formulation is "the application of pure concepts of the understanding to the manifold of sensory intuition." Thus, from Kant's perspective, the only way to obtain knowledge is "the application of the categories of the understanding to the manifold of sensory intuition." He states explicitly that "neither concepts without an intuition somehow corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can provide knowledge" (ibid.). Kant, in the very important and fundamental discussion of the "transcendental deduction of the categories" in the Critique of Pure Reason, sought to prove precisely this meaning. The result is that "in the absence of the categories of the understanding or in the absence of the manifold of sensory intuition, the obtainment of knowledge is impossible," and this is, of course, a meaning that Kant explicitly affirmed. This last proposition is the principal foundation of Kant's discussions in the "paralogisms of pure reason." If to this last proposition, as the major premise of the argument, we add the proposition that "no manifold of sensory intuition is given of 'the soul' (according to the definition)," as the minor premise of the argument, then the conclusion that knowledge (rational and theoretical) of the soul is impossible will clearly follow. This is the conclusion Kant believes concerning the soul and is the principal support for Kant in advancing the discussions he presents in the "paralogisms of pure reason." It is on the basis of this fundamental proposition that Kant claims that the application of categories and concepts such as substance, unity, and simplicity to "the soul" is impossible. Therefore, what is called "rational psychology" is based on paralogism. It can be said that Kant, in the discussion of the "paralogisms of pure reason," sought to demonstrate and establish the fundamental negative conclusion arising from the "transcendental deduction of the categories" in a concrete and detailed manner with respect to the subject of the soul. Accordingly, in the position of "critiquing Kant's foundations in the paralogisms," attention must be paid to this principal and fundamental foundation (see Ḥamdullāhī and Umīd, 1397/2018, pp. 117–120).
Another important and fundamental foundation on which Kant's views concerning "rational arguments regarding the existence and attributes of the soul" rest is his definition and description of "the soul." Kant, in various places in the Critique of Pure Reason, uses different terms or expressions such as "the thinking I," "the thinking subject," "the object of inner sense," and "pure self-consciousness" to refer to "the soul" and to indicate it. Under each of these terms or expressions, relatively different attributes are ascribed by Kant to "the soul." What must be attended to in "critiquing Kant's foundations in the paralogisms" is the compatibility or incompatibility of these attributes and meanings with one another and with the other principles and foundations presented in Kant's philosophical system. Although Kant, in various places in the Critique of Pure Reason, uses different terms or expressions to refer to "the soul" and to indicate it, his emphasis is more on the expression or term "the thinking I," and it is precisely this concept that he introduces as the subject of rational psychology (the discussion of the paralogisms of pure reason being responsible for demonstrating the paralogistic character of those discussions) (see Kant, 1929: B400, B401). Kant, in his statements, ascribes different attributes and characteristics to this "thinking I" (see ibid.: B399–400), but his emphasis is on the characteristic of the "transcendental" and "non-empirical" character of the "I." It is precisely because of this important and fundamental characteristic of the "I" that Kant can claim that "no manifold of sensory intuition is given of the 'I.'" This last proposition, as noted in the preceding lines, constitutes the minor premise of Kant's fundamental argument for the unknowability of "the soul" (see Ḥamdullāhī and Umīd, 1397/2018, pp. 116–117).
Although Kant emphasizes and explicitly states the "transcendental" and non-empirical character of the "thinking I," and therefore the "non-intuitability of sensory intuition" of it, his statements are inconsistent in several places. Kant, in numerous instances, refers to "the I," the soul, as "the object of inner sense," "inner intuition," "inner perception," "inner experience," and the like (see Kant, 1929: A357, 362, 381, 385 & B400–403). This matter is necessary by virtue of certain other dimensions and aspects of Kant's fundamental thought. The important question that arises here is: Is "the I" as "the thinking I," transcendental and non-empirical, or is it, as "the object of inner sense," empirical and "inner"? Or, to put it differently, are the characteristics Kant has enumerated for the "thinking I" compatible with the characteristics of the "I" as "the object of inner sense"? Can these two sets of characteristics be combined, or not? There are two possible answers to this question; and as we know, as some commentators on Kant have pointed out (Strawson, 1993: 248), the "I" is, in Kant's view, both "different" and "distinct" from the "I" as the object of inner sense, which is itself a source of difficulty and inconsistency. It is necessary to pay attention to this important point, even briefly, because it is one of the important and fundamental matters in the critique and evaluation of Kant's foundations in the discussion of the "paralogisms of pure reason," and it must be attended to in the critique and evaluation of the compatibility or incompatibility of Kant's various descriptions and characteristics, in accordance with the various dimensions of the philosophical system, as well as the "I" with the other principles and foundations presented in Kant's philosophy (see Ḥamdullāhī and Umīd, 1397/2018, pp. 118–120).

Conclusion
The book The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in Kant's Philosophy is, as the first Persian-language book on psychological issues in Kant's thought, a work that has drawn the attention of Iranian thinkers and scholars to this important subject and has opened a path for reflection in this area; it is from this perspective an important and valuable work. The author's purpose was to analyze and elucidate Kant's views in the discussion of the paralogisms of pure reason and, at the same time, to critique and examine these views.
However, careful and fair examination of the book shows that, alongside its merits and strengths, it has certain serious and fundamental shortcomings and weaknesses that have overshadowed its strengths. Apart from certain formal and superficial objections, the most important weaknesses of this work are: (1) excessive attention to preliminary and secondary matters and marginal discussion; (2) the derivative and adaptive character of the three principal chapters of the book, without precise and clear citation of the original sources; (3) the weakness of the coherence and logical interconnection of the book's material and various chapters; (4) the absence of a coherent rational-logical method and approach in critiquing Kant's views and, consequently, the superficiality and shallowness of the critiques advanced against Kant's views.
It is evident that, by attending to these strengths and weaknesses and striving to strengthen the strengths and avoid the weaknesses, we can in the future witness stronger and more substantial works in this field.